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ABSTRACT
China remains the single largest producer of pirated and counterfeit
goods in the world. The purpose of this article is to explore the
different factors that have impeded effective trademark protection in
China. In particular, this article analyzes the cultural barriers between
the United States and China, and in doing so, helps one understand the
climate of hostility between the two nations when it comes to trademark
enforcement. This article further analyzes the constant pressure
exercised by the United States against China, which has led to the
adoption of trademark laws by the Chinese government at the national
and international level but has proven to be ineffective in the short-run.
This article also provides an overview of Chinese history and culture to
establish the foundation upon which the present trademark legal system
was built, and to explain how these cultural mores are inconsistent with
intellectual property rights as perceived under Western culture. Finally,
this article explores an alternative to the coercive approach adopted by
the United States to protect trademark owners in China. It is based
upon the EU-China model which promotes leniency, understanding,
and cooperation in the long-run.
INTRODUCTION
Business entities and individuals have a legitimate interest in
2
protecting their trademarks abroad. However, when it comes to
protecting their trademark(s) in China, the international community has
voiced some deep concern about China’s dedication and ability to
3
provide protection. Indeed, China is viewed as the single largest
4
producer of pirated and counterfeit goods in the world. This harsh
critique of China’s inability to protect trademark and intellectual
5
property rights (“IPR”) in general is widely spread in the West. While
China is undertaking a historic and unprecedented advancement in the
2. See Scott A. McKenzie, Comment, Global Protection of Trademark Intellectual
Property Rights: A Comparison of Infringement and Remedies Available in China versus the
European Union, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 529, 531 (1998-1999).
3. Wei Shi & Robert Weatherley, Harmony or Coercion? China-EU Trade Dispute
Involving Intellectual Property Enforcement, 25 WIS. INT’ L. L.J. 439, 442 (2007).
4. Anne M. Wall, Symposium: National Sports Law Institute of Advisors: Intellectual
Property Protection in China: Enforcing Trademark Rights, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 341,
342 (2006); see Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2008 Special 301 at p. 19,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf (last visited
March 5, 2011) [hereinafter “USTR”].
5. Robert H. Hu, International Legal Protection of Trademarks in China, 13 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 69, 76 (2009).
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legal protection of trademarks, ongoing debates have raged on between
6
the West and China. The West, led by the United States, continues to
7
assert that China has done poorly in protecting foreign trademarks.
Trademark piracy in China is still rampant and continues to cost foreign
8
trademark owners billions of dollars in lost sales and jobs.
Consequently, the United States’ constant frustration with China’s
failure to protect and enforce trademark and IPR in general in China
has led the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) to place China on the
Priority Foreign Country Watch List for epidemic infringements of IPR
9
more than once. Each year on the last day of April, the USTR’s Office
issues the Special 301 Report that places countries on a priority foreign
10
country list. Many American businesses that recommended that China
be put on the priority watch list in the next Special 301 Report on April,
11
30 2010, have been heard as China remains on the priority watch list in
12
2010. As of today, China continues to be the most notorious and
13
singled-out country for piracy and counterfeiting practices.
Conversely, China justifiably claims that it has made substantial
strides in establishing a modern trademark system within a short period
of time. Such action demonstrates China’s commitment to fight
intellectual property piracy and counterfeiting within its borders. To
further demonstrate its commitment, China actively engaged on the
international platform, signed several international treaties and
conventions, and acceded to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in
14
2001. Following its accession to the WTO, China has complied with
6. Id. at 74.
7. Id.
8. The U.S. Secretary of State, Carlos Guttierez stated that the theft of IP in China
was costing U.S. businesses an estimated $2.3 billion a year and called on China to strengthen
its fight against “rampant counterfeiting.”
9. USTR, supra note 4, at 19.
10. Id.
11. Amy Tsui, China Remains Top IPR Priority for Many Business Group Say at
Special
301
Hearing,
Mar.
12,
2010,
available
at
http://news.bna.com/ptln/PTLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=16408158&vname=ptcjnotallissu
es&fn=16408158&jd=a0c2g1x5r1&split=0.
12.
2010
Special
Report,
19
(April
30,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1906 (holding that despite the positive steps China took in
2009 with respect to IPR enforcement, the overall IPR theft in China remains
“unacceptable”).
13. Donald P. Harris, Nineteenth Annual Philip D. Reed Memorial Issue: Article: The
Honeymoon is Over: The U.S.-China WTO Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM
INT’ L. L.J. 96, 102 (2009).
14. See Info, Office of the State Council, New Progress in China’s Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights, Part. III (1994), available at http://china.org.cn/e-
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the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
15
Rights (TRIPS). Thus, China leaves no doubt as to its commitment to
becoming a competitive, “innovation-oriented” country that should
16
command international respect regarding IPR protection.
Yet, China’s efforts in adhering to its domestic and international
duties have not substantially reduced the problem of IPR piracy and
17
trademark infringement in China.
At the national level, despite
adequately implemented resources, including anti-piracy campaigns and
an increasing number of IPR cases brought before Chinese courts,
overall levels of piracy, counterfeiting, and trademark infringement
18
remained unacceptably high in 2007. Similarly, at the international
level, although China’s legislation has been in accordance with
international standards, enforcement under the TRIPs Agreement
19
remains mediocre. TRIPS is viewed as the “benchmark” for gauging
the adequacy of China’s trademark laws because it sets the standard for
20
international IPR protection. According to the 2008 USTR Report,
inadequate IPR enforcement is a key factor contributing to these
21
shortcomings. Thus, the West, especially the United States, continues
to claim that legislation without enforcement in China is “elusive and
22
deceptive, as are rights without remedy.”
Trademark enforcement in China remains poor. However, critics of
the Chinese trademark regime and its enforcement seem to disregard
the influence of culture on China’s current efforts to enforce trademark
23
infringement within its borders. Indeed, Confucianism, and later on
Communism, did not ratify the idea of providing property-like
24
protection to products of the individual intellect. This explains why

white/intellectual/index.htm [hereinafter “Office of the State Council”].
15. Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 440.
16. Wall, supra note 4, at 354.
17. Hu, supra note 5, at 82.
18. USTR, supra note 4, 20.
19. Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 443.
20.
See TERENCE P. STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A
NEGOTIATING HISTORY 2249 (1986-1994) (introducing TRIPs as the cornerstone of the
global IPR regime).
21. USTR, supra note 4, at 2.
22. Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 443.
23. Dexin Tian, The Chinese Cultural Perceptions of Innovation, Fair Use, and the
Public Domain: A Grass-Roots Approach to Studying the U.S.-China Copyright Disputes
(2008), available at http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Tian%20Dexin.pdf?bgsu1224963994.
24. John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes Towards
Property Rights in Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT’ L ECON. L. 735, 786-87
(1999).
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protection of trademarks in China depends not only on the study of
existing laws but on an understanding of China’s history and culture. As
China is gradually changing its economic system into a market-based
25
model, new concepts of private property and individual rights have
emerged. China has realized that the recognition of private rights has
become a requisite to attract and protect foreign investments.
However, China’s problems in enforcing the rights of trademark
owners will not be remedied by the recourse to coercion that the United
States exercises against it. Instead, coercion will merely exacerbate
China’s reluctance to respond to the United States’ pressure. Thus, it is
imperative for the United States to understand China’s cultural and
socio-economic powers. Such understanding will help the United States
comprehend the problems China faces in enforcing trademarks within
its borders. Well aware that it was in its best interest to pursue the
“understanding” approach rather than the “coercive” approach, the
European Union (“EU”) has managed to establish a relationship with
China that is mainly based on trust and harmony. Thus, while the
United States has yet to learn the lesson that coercion will not resolve
issues of trademark enforcement in China, it should exercise the
“understanding” approach by adopting the EU-China model, which
rests upon harmony, understanding, and cooperation.
The purpose of this article is to explore the different factors that
have impeded effective trademark protection throughout Chinese
history. In particular, this article analyzes the cultural barriers between
the United States and China, and in doing so, helps one understand the
climate of hostility between the two nations when it comes to trademark
enforcement. This article further analyzes the constant pressure
exercised by the United States against China that has led to the
adoption of trademark laws by the Chinese government but has proven
to be ineffective on the short-run.
Part I of this article addresses the development of intellectual
property in China and the implementation of trademark laws, as well as
China’s accession to various international treaties and convention in
response to the overwhelming pressure from the United States.
Part II of this article provides an overview of Chinese history and
culture to establish the foundation upon which the present trademark
legal system was built, and to explain how these cultural mores are
inconsistent with intellectual property rights as perceived by Western
25. Naigen Zhang, Intellectual Property Law in China: Basic Policy and New
Developments, 4 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 5-6 (1997).
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culture.
Finally, Part III of this article explores an alternative to the coercive
approach adopted by the United States to protect trademark owners in
China. It is based upon the EU-China model that promotes leniency,
understanding, and cooperation in the long-run.
I. CHINA RESPONDS TO FOREIGN PRESSURE AND OVERHAULS ITS
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM TO PROTECT TRADEMARK RIGHTS
Despite its worldwide reputation for trademark infringement, China
has made considerable strides in entering and gaining acceptance from
26
the international intellectual property community. Now that China is
gradually changing its economic system into a competitive market-based
model, it has come to realize that it is crucial to protect the exclusive
27
rights of domestic and foreign trademark owners.
28
The 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China does not
29
The Chinese
specifically provide protection for trademarks.
30
government implemented the Trademark Law in 1982. Current laws
within the People’s Republic of China have been promulgated to
31
protect intellectual property rights. In addition, bilateral treaties and
32
international trade agreements currently afford trademark protection.
Together, they form the legal foundation upon which trademark owners
33
may be protected in China.

26. McKenzie, supra note 2, at 552.
27. Zhang, supra note 25, at 5-6.
28. Chinese Constitution, adopted on December 4, 1982, available at
http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm. The 1983 Constitution is currently valid
even though it was amended in 1988 and 1993.
29. See id.
30. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, State Intellectual Property
Office
of
P.R.C.
Oct.
27,
2001,
available
at
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws11.htm [hereinafter “Trademark Law”]. The
1982 Trademark Law was adopted before the 1982 Constitution was ratified by the National
People’s Congress. Adopted at the 24th Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth
National People’s Congress on 23 August 1982, revised for the first time according to the
Decision of the Amendment of the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China
adopted at the 30th Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s
Congress on 22 February 1993, and revised for the second time according to the Decision on
the Amendment of the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China adopted at the
24th Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on 27
October 2001.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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A. Trademark Rights Protection in China: Awareness of the Risk
Several attempts to promulgate regulations governing trademark
34
rights were made in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the old trademark
system played a very limited role in the protection of trademark
35
holders’ rights. Indeed, there was virtually no incentive to infringe
trademarks in the centralized planning economy because Chinese
producers were not concerned as to whether their products could be
36
sold; their only concern was to follow government planning.
China has been experiencing an unprecedented transformation of its
37
trademark and legal systems to protect trademarks. To respond to a
rapid economic development that started to attract foreign businesses,
and partly because of pressure exercised by the U.S., China has taken
major steps to provide trademark protection. First, China realized that
its economy had to modernize by embracing market-based principles
38
already in place in the West. Otherwise, China knew it would face the
39
risk of an economic “dysfunction” of disastrous magnitude. Second,
the Chinese government implemented a body of law for the creation of
a market economy, both as an end in itself and as an attraction for
40
additional foreign investments. Third and lastly, China began major
initiatives to improve its overall system of higher education, with greater
41
emphasis on education in science, technology, and law. As a result, in
1977 China launched an economic reform that mainly overhauled its
42
national legal system, including intellectual property law. This marked
the point at which China openly acknowledged the need to protect the
43
rights of trademark owners as a means to attract foreign investments.
Trademark protection in China is currently afforded, under the
44
Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, upon issuance of a
45
Certificate of Registration. It is worth noting that trademark owners
who have not registered their trademark may still seek protection under
certain provisions of the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Hu, supra note 5, at 73.
Zhang, supra note 25, at 5.
Id.
Hu, supra note 5, at 71.
Allison & Lin, supra note 24, at 786-87.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 787.
McKenzie, supra note 2, at 553.
Id. at 552.
See Trademark Law, supra note 30.
See id.
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46

China or the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China
47
(Provision of Intellectual Property Crime). Another type of trademark
protection that is afforded under Chinese law is the Law Against Unfair
48
Competition of the People’s Republic of China. Unfair competition is
defined as activities that might damage the legal rights and interests of
49
The Law
others and “disturb the order of [the] social economy.”
Against Unfair Competition prohibits the misappropriation of trade
secrets and provides holders of well-known marks anti-dilution
50
protection—like protection for loss of good will.
However, trademark owners should not underestimate the benefits
of the registration process in China. Indeed, as opposed to the first-touse principle that is applied in the United States for registration of a
mark, Chinese trademark law follows the first-to-file principle. This
fundamental difference has caught many foreign trademark owners by
51
surprise. U.S. trademark owners are familiar with the U.S. principle
where trademark rights extend back to the date of first use, or to the
date of filing the registration subject to later use of the mark. Thus, in
the U.S., an unregistered trademark user may still establish protected
trademark ownership rights under common law if it can prove prior use
relative to a junior user. Conversely, in China, the exclusive right to use
a registered trademark in commerce extends to the owner of record
according to the earliest date of filing, or other priority filing recognized

46. Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, State Intellectual Property Office
of P.R.C., available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws10.htm (last visited
March 5, 2011). Adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress on
March 15, 1999.
47. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (Provisions of Intellectual
Property
Crime),
available
at
http://english.customs.gov.cn/Default.aspx?TabID=4712&InfoID=7897&ctl=InfoDetail&mid
=12908&ContainerType=G&default&ContainerSrc=notitle.ascx (last visited March 5, 2011)
[hereinafter “Criminal Law”]. Adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s
Congress on July 1, 1979, and amended by the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People’s
Congress on March 4, 1997.
48. Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, State
Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C., available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/
(last visited February 23, 2010). Adopted at the Third Session of the Standing Committee of
the Eighth National People’s Congress on September 2, 1993. Promulgated by Order No. 10
of the President of the People’s Republic of China on September 2, 1993 and Effectives of
December 1, 1993.
49. Jeffrey F. Levine, Meeting the Challenges of International Brand Expansion in
Professional Sports: Intellectual Property Right Enforcement in China through Treaties,
Chinese Law and Cultural Mechanisms, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 203, 222 (2007).
50. Id.
51. Wall, supra note 4, at 372.
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52

elsewhere.
Thus, unlike in the U.S., trademark owners need not
submit evidence of use of the mark at either the application or
53
To their own detriment, many U.S. trademark
registration stage.
owners have already entered Chinese commerce without prior
registration of their trademarks with the Trademark Office when they
soon discovered that their trademark has been infringed.
Authors have disagreed as to the benefits and burdens of the first-tofile principle currently in place in China. Because U.S. trademark
owners can register their marks in China before actually using them,
they can benefit from the protection of their marks before they incur
substantial capital expenses of actually selling and distributing
trademarked goods, or providing services associated with those marks,
54
in China. However, it is not unlikely that the U.S. trademark is already
55
Thus,
registered in China by a third party, possibly a competitor.
trademark owners should be cautioned to register their trademark in
China before considering doing business there.
Moving on to the registration process, as previously stated, the first
step to the protection and enforcement of trademarks in China requires
that trademarks be registered in China. In China, the term “trademark”
is defined as “any visual sign capable of distinguishing the goods or
services of one natural person, legal entity or any other organization
from that of others, including any word, design, letters of an alphabet,
numerals, three-dimensional symbol, combinations of colours, and their
56
combination[s].”
Moreover, trademarks, service marks, collective
57
marks, and certification marks are recognized under Chinese law.
Application for registration of trademarks, service marks, and trade
dress are handled through the Trademark Office under the State
58
Administration of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”). Under the State
Council, the Trademark Office of the SAIC oversees registration and

52. Id.
53. Frank X. Curci, Symposium: Transnational Business in the Twenty-First Century:
Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights Overseas, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW 15, 16 (2002).
54. Id. at 17.
55. Id.
56. See Trademark Law, supra note 30, at art. 8; see Protect Your Intellectual Property
Rights in China, Ministry of Commerce of the P.R.C., May 23, 2006, available at
http://www.mac.doc.gov/china/docs/businessguides/intellectualpropertyrights.htm.
57. Trademark Law, supra note 30, at art. 3.
58. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, International Trade, Protecting Your Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR) in China: A Practical Guide for U.S. Companies, available at
http://www.mac.doc.gov/china/IPRNEW.htm (last visited March 1, 2010) [hereinafter “IPR
Toolkit”].
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administration of trademarks throughout the country. The SAIC has
three responsibilities: (1) processing trademark registration applications
and deciding on approvals in accordance with the law; (2) supervising
the use of trademark and deciding on the revocation of registered
trademarks; and (3) recording licensing contracts for the use of
60
registered trademarks.
The Trademark Office accepts applications directly from individuals
and legal entities through state-designated agents and also through
procedures established under international treaties or agreements such
61
as the Madrid Protocol. If the applicant is a foreign entity without a
direct presence in China, the applicant must use a certified state62
designated agent to apply for the registration. Once the application is
received with payment of the fees, it must pass the preliminary approval
examination. Once it passes such examination, the application is
published for opposition. The time allocated to oppose the application
is three months from the day of publication. The applicant may apply
before the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board (TRAB) for
63
review of the opposition.
If there is no opposition, the mark will
proceed to registration and a certificate of trademark registration will be
issued. A mark may be refused for registration on several grounds,
including whether the mark is (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3)
geographically descriptive, (4) in conflict with an existing registration,
(5) confusedly similar to the flags, emblems or name of China, foreign
countries, or international governmental organizations, (6) harmful to
socialist morals and customs, or (7) otherwise considered obnoxious. In
the case of a rejection, the applicant has fifteen days to appeal to the
64
Trademark Review and Adjudication Board.
Once the trademark registration process has been completed and a
Certificate of Registration issued, the registration must be recorded with
65
Recordation
the General Administration of Customs (“GAC”).
66
Thus,
enables the GAC to ban counterfeit goods at the border.
without it, the GAC has no authority to stop infringing goods at the
59. Trademark Law, supra note 30, at art. 2.
60. See IPR Toolkit, supra note 58.
61. See infra note 77.
62. See IPR Toolkit, supra note 58.
63. See Trademark Law, supra note 30, at art. 33.
64. Id. at art. 32.
65. General Administration of Customs, Customs Recordation and Enforcement
procedures, available at http://english.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal191/ (last visited March 1,
2010).
66. See IPR Toolkit, supra note 58.
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67

Chinese border. Once the recordation is granted, it is valid for a term
68
of ten years and renewable thereafter. The registrant can enjoy the
exclusive right to use its trademarks, which are now protected under
69
China’s laws.
Finally, foreign trademark owners should consider filing separate
registrations in all available transliterations and translations of the mark
in Chinese characters, letters, and numerals within each class of trade in
which the trademark will be used to secure the highest level of
70
protection for their trademarks.
Thus, foreign trademark owners
should register their trademark in China before doing business there to
avoid any undesired and harmful results that can directly affect their
entire business.
China’s commitment to protect trademarks in China has not been
limited to the adoption of domestic laws under domestic registration.
Indeed, China has joined in or signed six multilateral conventions,
71
treaties, and agreements. Consequently, trademark owners may obtain
an international registration in addition to the Chinese registration.
Chinese legal scholars generally concede that treaties and agreements
once adopted or acceded by China become sources of China’s domestic
72
law and achieve the full force and effect of binding legal rules. This is
supported by the General Principles of the Civil Law, which provides
73
that international treaties and agreements supersede domestic law.
In 1985, China became a member of the Paris Convention for the
74
Protection of Intellectual Property (“Paris Convention”), which
protects industrial property in the widest sense, including inventions,
marks, industrial designs, utility models, trade names, geographical
75
indications, and the repression of unfair completion. To comply with
67. Id.
68. Trademark Law, supra note 30, at art. 30.
69. Id. at art. 3.
70. Wall, supra note 4, at 374.
71. See Office of the State Council, supra note 14.
72. See ALBERT HY CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 103 (1992).
73. See General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Rep. of China, art. 142,
available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2696 (last visited March 1, 2010)
[hereinafter “General Principles of Civil Law”].
74. China became a member of the Paris Convention in March 19, 1985. Contracting
Parties to the Paris Convention, World Intellectual Property Organization, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited February
28, 2010).
75. Convention of Paris, signed in Paris on March 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available
at http://wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary-paris.html.
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the Paris Convention’s requirements for the registration of “service
marks” and the recognition of “well-known marks” in foreign
76
countries, China adopted the 2001 Trademark Law and later passed
the Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known
77
Marks in 2003. Moreover, China became a member of the Convention
78
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)
and entered into the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
79
Registration of Marks. The purpose of the Madrid Agreement is to
facilitate the acquisition of protection for marks among member states.
Thus, the owner of a trademark that is registered in its country of origin
80
may file for an international registration through the WIPO. Once
approved, the mark will be deemed registered and protected in all of the
member states’ territories. To comply with the Agreement, the State
Administration for Industry & Commerce of China issued the Policy for
81
Implementation of International Registration of Marks in June 2003.
On December 1, 1995, China became a state party to the Protocol
Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
82
Registration of Marks (“Madrid Protocol”). The Madrid Protocol is
an international system for the registration of marks that addresses
shortcomings identified within the registration system established under
83
the Madrid Agreement.
For instance, an eighteen-month period

76. Hu, supra note 5, at 85.
77. Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks (issued by
the State Admin. for Industry & Commerce on April 17, 2003), available at
http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/english/show.asp?id=57&bm=flfg.
78. China became a contracting party of the WIPO Convention on June 3, 1980.
Contracting parties to WIPO Convention, World Intellectual Property Organization,
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treatyid=1 (last visited
February 28, 2010).
79. China became a contracting party on October 4, 1989. Contracting parties to the
Madrid Agreement, World Intellectual Property Organization, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/showresults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=21 (last visited February
28, 2010).
80. Madrid Agreement, arts. 3, 7, 8; see World Intellectual Property Org., Protocol
Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, June
27,
1989,
S.
Treaty
Doc.
No.
106-41,
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/madrid/trtdocs_wo032.html
[hereinafter
“Madrid
Protocol”].
81.
State Admin. for Indus. & Commerce, Policy for the Implementation of
International Registration of Marks under Madrid Agreement (Apr. 17, 2003), available at
htpp://www.mlipa.com/2/fl/14.doc.
82.
Contracting
Parties
to
the
Madrid
Protocol,
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/showresults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=8 (last visited February
28, 2010); see Madrid Protocol, supra note 80.
83. Edwin E. Wallis III, The Madrid Protocol: Will This International System Succeed
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instead of twelve months is allowed for state refusal to registration and a
84
Also, a failed
longer period for opposition by a third party.
international registration can be transformed into a national application
in each designated country, with the filing date and priority date of the
85
respective international registration.
Finally, China acceded to the World Trade Organization in
December 2001 and signed the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
86
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. Once again, China amended its
then-existing trademark law and regulations under Article 13 of the
2001 Trademark Law concerning recognition and protection of wellknown marks to comply with Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement.
By making consistent efforts to follow through on its bilateral treaty
obligations and domestic laws, the Chinese government has
undoubtedly shown that it is committed to protecting foreign
trademarks and IPR in general. China has shown that, within a short
period of time, it has established an impressive system to address
trademark protection. “As [many] Chinese legal scholars have correctly
observed, ‘In the process of implementing international treaties, China
87
has demonstrated the credibility of a responsible super nation.’” First,
China replaced its laws to respond to its rapid economic growth while
addressing the major concerns expressed by the West, especially the
88
United States. Indeed, China has passed new laws, re-promulgated
Trademark Law to now include trademark service protection, and kept
89
amending them to provide a new force. Second, China has adopted all
major international treaties and agreements concerning trademarks that
are in existence today. China’s involvement in the international
platform is important because under Chinese legal principles,
international rules will prevail over domestic laws when there is a
90
conflict between Chinese domestic law and the international norms.
in the United States?, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004).
84. Madrid Protocol, supra note 80, at art. 5.
85. Id. at art. 9quinquies.
86. World
Trade
Organization,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last visited March 1, 2010).
87. Hu, supra note 5, at 118.
88. Paul B. Birden Jr., Trademark Protection in China: Trends and Directions, 18
LOY. L.A. INT’ L & COMP. L. REV. 431, 432 (1996).
89. Id.
90. See General Principles of Civil Law, supra note 73, at art. 142; Civil Procedure
Law, art. 238, available at http://lehmmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/civilproceedings/law-of-civil-procedure-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-1991.htm;
Administrative
Procedure
Law,
art.
72,
available
at
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2695 (last visited March 5, 2011).
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Third, under the action of the Trademark Office, the Chinese
government has set up detailed rules and procedures for handling
international trademark applications for registration submitted under
91
the Madrid Union.
Fourth, China created the China Intellectual
Property Training Center in 1997 to train professionals on intellectual
92
property matters. Even more telling, in 1992, China launched its own
93
internal crackdown on counterfeit goods. Thus, overall, it may be fair
to say that China’s new trademark laws provide a viable framework for
94
the protection of most trademarks within the PRC.
B. Trademark Law Enforcement in China: Myth or Reality?
China’s unprecedented transformation of its trademark regime and
legal system to protect trademark owners did not stop there. Indeed,
China has also changed its judicial system to provide a means of
95
enforcement by engaging its courts actively in enforcing trademark
laws and adjudicating trademark and other IPR disputes and
96
infringement cases. Special intellectual property tribunals have been
set up within the People’s Court to hear intellectual property cases. For
instance, in June 1993, China founded the Beijing Intermediate People’s
Court Intellectual Property Rights Tribunal under the Beijing
97
Intermediate People’s Court. Since the creation of these specialized
courts, there has been a high increase in the number of intellectual
98
property cases. For instance, from 1998 to 2004, courts throughout the
country concluded 38,228 IPR-related civil cases of first instance and
2,057 criminal cases of first instance involving IPR infringement in
accordance with Section Seven, Chapter III of the “Specific Provisions”
99
of the “Criminal Law,” handing down sentences to 2,375 criminals. In
91. See Measures for the Implementation of Madrid International Registration of
Trademarks (issued by the State Admin. for Indus. & Commerce, Apr. 17, 2003, effective
June 1, 2003), available at http://en.cnci.gov.cn/Law/LawDetails.aspx?ID=6759 (last visited
March 5, 2011).
92. China Intellectual Property Training Center is the first national training center
dedicated to providing education on intellectual property issues and practice. SIPO, Annual
Report,
Ch.
IX,
section
2,
Training,
available
at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English//laws/annualreports/ndbg2003/200804/t20080416_380253.
html (last visited March 5, 2011).
93. Birden, supra note 88, at 432; see Millions of Fake Goods Uncovered, Destroyed,
China Daily (N. Am. Ed.), Nov. 17, 1992, art. 1.
94. McKenzie, supra note 2, at 553.
95. Id. at 554.
96. Hu, supra note 5, at 72.
97. Birden, supra note 88, at 481.
98. McKenzie, supra note 2, at 554.
99.
See IPR Toolkit, supra note 58.
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2004 alone, 8,332 civil IPR-related cases of first instance and 385
criminal cases of first instance involving IPR infringement were
100
As more and more
concluded, and 528 criminals were punished.
Chinese companies and individuals are becoming aware of their
101
trademark rights, they are more willing to go to court to protect them.
To enforce the protection of their exclusive right to use a registered
mark in China, foreign and domestic trademark owners have three
different channels under the Chinese legal code: (1) administrative
enforcement, (2) civil enforcement, and (3) criminal enforcement.
Trademark owners generally prefer to opt for a civil proceeding over an
administrative action because they can obtain a preliminary injunction
102
from the People’s Court before or at the time a suit is filed.
Furthermore, civil cases are generally handled within six months from
103
the filing date, with an additional three months for an appeal.
Finally, trademark infringement can also be criminally prosecuted
under China’s Criminal Code. Because criminal prosecution is viewed
as a greater deterrent, many trademark owners have elected it over the
104
administrative and civil actions.
Indeed, it is a crime to use another
party’s registered trademark intentionally, sell merchandise under a
fake trademark, and manufacture any representation of a registered
105
mark without authorization from the registered owner.
To respond
against regionalism and corruption, China has stiffened the penalties for
counterfeiting trademarks.
For instance, criminal penalties for
trademark infringement may result in imprisonment for up to three
years, and in cases where the violation was intentional, up to seven
106
years.
However, despite the threat of incarceration for trademark
infringement, fines cannot exceed twenty-percent of the “illegal
107
business or twice the profit earned by the infringement.”
To further demonstrate China’s commitment to fight trademark
infringement and bring support to trademark owners, the Chinese

100. Id.
101. See Office of the State Council, supra note 14.
102. See Trademark Law, supra note 30, at art. 57.
103. He Zhonglin, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Law in Post-WTO China,
BCLA Seminar, July 25, 2002, available at http://chinaiprlaw.com/english/forum/forum40.htm.
104. Jessica C. Wong, The Challenges Multinational Corporations Face in Protecting
Their Well-Known Trademarks in China, 31 BROOK. J. INT’ L L. 937, 968 (2006).
105. Criminal Law, supra note 47, at arts. 213-15.
106. Id.
107. Angela Mia Beam, Piracy of American Intellectual Property in China, 4 J. INT’ L.
L. & PRAC. 335, 347 (1995)(quoting Liwei Wang, The Chinese Traditions Inimical to the
Patent Law, 14 J. INT’ L. L. & BUS. 15, 15 (1993)).
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government, through its Supreme People’s Court, released the
“Interpretation by the [Supreme People’s Court] in Handling Criminal
108
Cases of Infringing Intellectual Property” in 2004. Chinese legislators
also amended the Criminal Law with Supplementary Provisions
Concerning the Punishment of Crimes of Counterfeiting Registered
Trademarks, which became effective in 1993. Thus, China has once
again proved its willingness and determination to protect trademarks
within its borders.
Yet, China remains under scrutiny and criticism for its poor
enforcement of trademark laws. Today, the greatest area of concern for
the international community is not so much the adoption of new laws
and the change of a judicial system for the protection of foreign and
109
domestic trademark owners; instead, it is the actual enforcement of
110
these new laws that raise concern. China continues to face epidemic
111
trademark infringement despite constant international threats.
The
question remains as to what extent China’s trademark laws and IP
system in general is effective in protecting foreign trademarks.
Various factors may explain why a high number of trademark
112
infringement cases are never reported to authorities. More often than
not, Chinese companies elect to resolve the dispute in a private setting
113
to preserve relationships and save face, following past custom.
Furthermore, decentralization has contributed to the erosion of
Beijing’s control, the growth of regionalism and corruption, and the
114
remarkable rise in power of local officials.
“Although Beijing has
identified localism as a priority concern, it remains a major obstacle to
115
the enforcement of [trademark] laws in China.”
Indeed, “the legal
fragmentation between the central government and administrative

108. Interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s
Procura-torate on Several Issues of Concrete Application of Laws in Handling Criminal
Cases of Infringing Intellectual Property (Adopted at the 1331st Session of the Judicial
Comm. of the Supreme People’s Ct., Nov. 2, 2004, and the 28th Session of the Tenth
Procuratorial Comm. of the Sup. People’s Procuratorate, Nov. 11, 2004, effective Dec. 22,
2004), available at http://www.colaw.cn/findlaw/ip/infringing.htm (last visited March 5, 2011).
109. Doris Estelle Long, Article: The Protection of Information Technology in a
Culturally Diverse Marketplace, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 129, 158
(1996).
110. Id.
111. Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 445.
112. Wall, supra note 4, at 377-78.
113. Id. at 362.
114. See McKenzie, supra note 2, at 561.
115. Jeffrey W. Berkman, Intellectual Property Rights in the P.R.C.: Impediments to
Protection and the Need for the Rule of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 18 (1996).
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agencies makes it difficult to discern which authority will handle a
particular issue, or how one would have the authority to impose the rule
116
Moreover, as the Chinese governmental structure is
of law at all.”
dominated by local power, the application of international treaties
117
remains difficult to enforce.
“Beijing’s ability to enforce its
intellectual property regulations is seriously hampered by local
resistance to change, particularly when local authorities sense that such
118
change will take power out of their hands.”
Not surprisingly,
administrative agencies face powerful local officials, including military
officials, who benefit directly from piracy. Despite China’s pressure on
local governments to implement and enforce trademark laws, the level
of trademark infringement remains high, particularly in smaller towns
119
where factories generate the mass production of counterfeit goods.
Thus, because local businesses generate substantial sources of local
revenue, officials are unwilling to enforce trademark laws against them.
Some scholars have denounced the voluntary “resistance” of local
120
governments in enforcing the laws because they often seek to protect
121
factories engaged in piracy that are beneficial to the area’s economy.
Many trademark owners may fear retaliation in the form of potential
loss of market share if they file a complaint against a state-owned
business as “state-owned enterprises still control the most important
122
resources—especially capital.”
According to the 2008 USTR Special Report (“Special Report”),
116. Ryan P. Johnson, Steal this Note: Proactive Intellectual Property Protection in the
People’s Republic of China, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1005, 1025 (2006).
117. PETER K. YU, Intellectual Property, Economic Development and the China
Puzzle in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:
STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA
153, 174.
118. Aileen M. McGill, “How China Succeeded in Protecting Olympic Trademark and
Why This Success May not Generate Immediate Improvements in Intellectual Property
Protection in China” LOY. LAW & TECH. ANN. (2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/aileen_mcgill/2/ (quoting Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners:
Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China in Practising Law Institute, Intellectual
Property Aspects of Doing Business in China: Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook
Series 111, 118 (Oct. 2007)).
119. Id. at 14.
120. See ROBERT KLITGAARD et al., CORRUPTED CITIES: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO CURE AND PREVENTION, 17-22.
121. Amanda S. Reid, Case Notes and Comments: Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights in Developing Countries: China as a Case Study, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.
& POL’Y 63, 92-93 (2003).
122. Wu Jinglian, The road ahead for Capitalism in China, THE MCKINSEY Q. 2006
SPECIAL EDITION: SERVING THE NEW CHINESE CONSUMER (June 2006), at 118, available at
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/The_road_ahead_for_capitalism_in_China_1782.
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another major factor that has contributed to China’s poor IPR
enforcement is China’s persistent “underutilization” of criminal
deterrents. The Special Report stated that China continues to direct
123
most of its trademark enforcement to administrative authorities. The
Report concludes that the “[r]ules designed to promote transfer of cases
124
Moreover,
to criminal authorities . . . have not solved the problem.”
when trademark disputes reach the judicial system, the system fails to
provide adequate deterrence because the fines imposed on trademark
125
infringers are too low. Indeed, the amount of the fine for trademark
infringement is valued by the price of the infringing products on the
counterfeit market instead of the value of the original mark being
126
copied.
Consequently, it is not surprising that many infringers
perceive administrative seizures and fines as a cost of doing business,
127
making infringement an acceptable loss.
Finally, many authors have
argued that the Chinese criminal code is considered rather vague
because it fails to define what constitutes a counterfeiting crime of a
128
“serious nature.”
Thus, even if the local authorities apply the laws,
they may simply apply more lenient standards because of their statutory
ambiguity.
The current trademark protection and enforcement system in place
in China has failed to change Chinese behavior patterns that have
evolved over centuries. However, it should not be ignored that use of
China’s judicial system to enforce the protection of trademarks and IPR
in general is still evolving and cannot be solved overnight. Regardless
of criticism and despite serious flaws that continue to exist concerning
trademark enforcement, China’s trademark system is reasonably
effective. Because China is committed to protecting domestic and
foreign trademark owners, enforcement will be further strengthened.
II. WHEN CHINESE CULTURE IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO TRADEMARK
ENFORCEMENT
The ongoing issue of trademark law enforcement in China ought not
to be analyzed without addressing China’s cultural roots and heritage as

123. USTR, supra note 4 at 21.
124. Id.
125. See Jennifer L. Donatuti, Can China Protect the Olympics or Should the Olympics
be Protected from China?, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 203, 217-18 (2007).
126. Id. at 218.
127. USTR, supra note 4.
128. Stephanie M. Greene, Protecting Well-Known Marks in China: Challenges for
Foreign Mark Holders, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 371, 392 (2008).
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129

the primary ground for China’s lack of enforcement. Indeed, cultural
factors may explain the poor progress of trademark protection in China
despite the implementation of new trademark and intellectual property
130
laws.
The notion of trademark rights, as well as the concept of IPR, is
131
relatively new in China.
For thousands of years, IPR have been
absent in China’s history even though the Chinese have been creative
132
Until recently, the protection of
and innovative in many fields.
trademarks and intellectual property in China was not a primary
133
concern to the Chinese government.
Indeed, the adoption of
trademark laws to protect owners did not come in response to the need
134
of the Chinese people to protect their rights. Instead, it was triggered
by the constant pressure and frustration from the U.S. on the Chinese
government to protect the intellectual property interests of U.S.
nationals eager to do business in China. Thus, such concepts remain, to
some extent, foreign to the Chinese community in which individual
rights and private property have been overpowered by the interests of
135
society.
Chinese imperial rulers used Confucian values to legitimize their
136
governmental regime and their own authority. Regarded by many as
an ethical code, Confucianism served as a guide to Chinese peoples’
137
behavior from the sixth century B.C. to the middle of the 20th century.
The Confucian ideology, which essentially focused on the transmission
138
or passing down of intellectual property works for others to build on,
129. See Long, supra note 109, at 159.
130. See Thomas Tze-Hun Chou, Private Copyright Investment in China, 1 J. SMALL
& EMERGING BUS. L. 375, 393 (1997).
131. Hu, supra note 5, at 72-73.
132. Tian, supra note 23, at 17.
133. Donald P. Harris, Nineteenth Annual Philip D. Reed Memorial Issue: Article: The
Honeymoon is Over: The U.S.-China WTO Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 96, 103 (2009).
134. See Jennifer A. Crane, Riding the Tiger: A Comparison of Intellectual Property
Rights in the United States and the People’s Republic of China, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL.
PROP. 95 (2008).
135. See id.
136. Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East-Asia: From the Legal
Culture Perspective, 1 APLPJ 13, 87 (2000).
137. Deli Yang, The development of intellectual property in China, WORLD PATENT
INFORMATION
VOL.
25:
131,
at
134,
available
at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V5D-48761R71/2/c2ba4aff7e08722ab0ce75499ad69efb 2003.
138. L. Montgomery & B. Fitzgerald, Copyright and the creative industries in China
(2006), INT’L J OF CULTURAL STUD. 2006, 9: 407, at 408.

HOOVER - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

344

MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW

6/20/2011 1:04 PM

[Vol. 15:2

strongly encouraged imitation of teachers as a way of learning, loyalty to
139
masters, and subordination of individual interests to the social good.
The state and its people believed in “ren min de li yi gao yu yi qie,” that
is, the peoples’ interest is first. The family, not the individual,
140
constituted the unit of the social and political community.
Legal
141
Conversely,
obligations were attached to the family relationship.
Western law regulated private and economic rights and duties of the
142
individual.
Not surprisingly, the notion of private ownership was
143
regarded as contrary to socialist community life.
Thus, until recently, the Chinese never viewed IPR violations as the
“taking away” of one’s individual rights. Instead, sharing, copying, and
infringing were highly valued within China’s tradition and thus,
perfectly acceptable. The emergence of the Chinese Communist Party
144
in 1949 furthered such tradition.
For instance, work products were
collectively owned by the State for the good of society. Thus, the State
served the common good for its people.
Moreover, although morality and propriety were important in
145
Confucianism, they were not regulated by external laws. Instead, the
146
use of external laws was a strongly disapproved means of governance.
Notwithstanding Confucian ideals, external laws were mostly used
where self-regulation failed to provide an adequate remedy. For
centuries, Chinese people who respected the rule of man (ren-zhi),
rather than the rule of law (fa zhi), viewed lawsuits as bad luck, even
evil. Accordingly Confucius’ Analects:
Lead the people with governmental measures and
regulate them by law and punishments, and they will
avoid wrong-doing, but will have no sense of honor or
shame. Lead them by virtue and regulate them by the
rules of propriety and they will have a sense of shame,
147
and moreover, set themselves right.
139. Tian, supra note 23, at 50.
140. Shin-yi Peng, supra note 136, at 134.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See, generally, A. M. Bean, Piracy of American Intellectual Property in China, J.
INT’L L. & PRAC. 339 (1995).
144. Tian, supra note 23, at 50-51.
145. Ann Kent, Waiting for Rights: China’s Human Rights and China’s Constitution,
1949-1989, HUMAN RIGHTS Q., VOL. 13, NO. 2 , May 1991, 170, 174.
146. Tze-Hun Chou, supra note 130, at 394.
147. WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
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Thus, wrongdoing, such as trademark infringement, has not been
deterred by the risk of facing prison time or paying fines. Instead,
wrongdoing has been deterred by the Chinese’s fear of shame and
148
dishonor among society. Even today, it is not uncommon practice to
make a public apology as the acceptance of wrongdoing. Indeed,
149
apologies are often ordered by the court in its judgments.
They are
generally published in newspapers and other media to eliminate the
150
“adverse effect” of the infringement. If an infringer fails to apologize
as ordered, the court may draft and publish an apology instead and
151
charge the expense to the wrongdoer. The Chinese believe that such
acknowledgment will create such an embarrassment that it will serve as
a future deterrent. In other words, an apology is more like a shaming
penalty, or the alternative remedy of “eliminating the effects of the
152
[infringing] act,” or both. Not surprisingly, courts have been ordering
a public apology in many trademark infringement cases.
Despite China’s rapid political and economic growth in the recent
years, the “cultural mores and the laws that reflect them have
consistently retained a Confucian and Marxist basis of subjugation of
153
individual interest to the greater good of society.”
Consequently,
154
Thus,
many Chinese people consider state laws as the last recourse.
even today, the Chinese still prefer settling a dispute through an
informal process.
III. ANALYSIS
The United States has constantly put pressure on China to

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 20 (Stanford
University Press 1997).
148. Tze-Hun Chou, supra note 130, at 394.
149. Peter K. Yu, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit: Article: From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual
Property in Post-WTO-China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 953 (2006).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Aileen M. McGill, “How China Succeeded in Protecting Olympic Trademark and
Why This Success May not Generate Immediate Improvements in Intellectual Property
Protection in China” LOY. LAW & TECH. ANN. (2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/aileen_mcgill/2/; see also Tao-Tai Hsia & Kathryn A. Huan, Laws of
the People’s Republic of China on Industrial and Intellectual Property, 5 LAW & POL’Y INT’
L BUS. 743, 750 (1973).
154. McGill, supra note 116, at 15 (citing TAN LOKE KHOON, PIRATES IN THE
MIDDLE KINGDOM: THE ART OF TRADEMARK WAR (2004) at 4-5).
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implement and enforce new laws to protect trademarks and other type
of IPRs. For instance, the United States has been pushing for more
criminal enforcement to fight against the proliferation of “safe harbors,”
which have spared Chinese trademark infringers from criminal
155
liability. Each time, China has responded favorably by adopting and
amending its existing laws to satisfy the U.S.’s expectations to provide
tougher protection. Even more telling, China did so in a very short
period of time. Yet, China’s efforts have remained unsatisfactory.
A. From Coercion to Understanding: The United States Should Adopt the
China-E.U. Model
It has become obvious that the United States’ coercive policy
towards trademark and IPR protection in general has been
156
miscalculated in obtaining the expected results. Since the late 1980s,
the United States pursued a very aggressive foreign intellectual property
157
Indeed, it repeatedly threatened China with
policy towards China.
economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal of most-favored nation
158
status, and opposition to China’s entry into the WTO.
A prime
example is the frequent use of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 by
159
the United States against China.
In another instance, negotiations
seeking active intellectual property enforcement and improved market
access between the United States and China ended in 1995 when the
USTR threatened to impose 100 percent tax on 1.08 billion of Chinese
imports into the United States if enforcement issues were not
160
resolved. Finally, the United States filed two trade complaints against
China at the WTO for the deficiency in China’s IPR laws and market
161
access barriers to copyright-based industries.
As a result, the gap

155. USTR, supra note 4, at 21; see generally Matthew W. Cheney, Trading With the
Dragon: A Critique of the Use of Sanctions by the United States Against China, 6 JOURNAL OF
INT’L LAW & PRACTICE 1, 25-26 (1997) (arguing that U.S.’s threats of trade sanctions in
some way placed the U.S. in a worse position than before sanctions were taken).
156. See Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 446.
157. Yu, supra note 149, at 934.
158. Id. at 999; see Wayne M. Morrison, CRS Issue for Congress, China-U.S. Trade
Issues, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/41125.pdf (last updated Nov.
3, 2004).
159. USTR, supra note 4.
160. Id.
161. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States Files
WTO Cases Against China Over Deficiencies in China’s Intellectual Property Rights Laws and
Market Access Barriers to Copyright-Based Industries (Apr. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2007/april/united-statesfiles-wto-cases-against-china.
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between the United States and China has deepened.
At no time has the United States considered China’s culture as one
of the major impediments to enforcement of trademark laws in China.
Thus, despite what the United States may claim, Chinese legislation is
162
not necessarily “the root cause” of all China’s problems regarding
legal enforcement. Instead, the root cause is China’s long-cherished and
163
deep-rooted culture.
Failure to understand Chinese culture will
inevitably lead to the failure of foreign government attempts, like the
164
U.S. government, to enforce trademark laws in China.
As Jeffrey
Levine correctly stated:
[E]ffective IPR enforcement lies not exclusively through
the use of courts, laws, treaties and international
organizations, but also through the development of
stakeholders relationships and the incentives they
engender, the foundation of most mutually beneficial
business ventures. Using an approach that accounts for
Chinese cultural norms seems like a more promising
approach to IPR enforcement as compared to forcing
adoption of Western legal concepts which lack
congruency with the Chinese approach to law and
165
culture.
In response to the U.S.’s coercive approach, the Chinese
government has become more and more reluctant to take the necessary
measures to meet the trademark protection standards. This may be
explained by the lack of mutual trust and understanding between the
two nations, and the ongoing use of trade threats made by the U.S..
Thus, the increasing demand made by the U.S. resulted in making the
Chinese government and its officials more defensive than receptive to
166
strengthening its trademark protection regime.
While the U.S.’s coercive approach may be arguably effective in
triggering immediate compliance by the Chinese government, such gains
have been temporary as they have not been followed by effective
enforcement.
Indeed, this coercive approach tends to invite
162.
(1994).
163.
164.
165.
166.

See Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 712
Allison & Lin, supra note 24, at 786.
Id.
Levine, supra note 49, at 229.
Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 447.
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167

retaliation. Specifically, in one instance, in response to Washington’s
refusal to delay its consideration of sanctions against China regarding
the production of pirated video cassettes and compact disks, China sent
a deliberate message to Washington, that it had the ability to turn to
European partners, when it placed an order with France for an
estimated 1.5 billion dollars worth of Airbus planes, instead of Boeing
168
planes as it initially planned.
Arguably, this shows a preference in
China towards the EU’s flexible and cooperative approach. Thus, the
use of coercion against China as the U.S. dominant tactics has proven to
169
be unsuccessful in reducing piracy and trademark infringement.
Furthermore, many scholars have denounced the failure of the
United States’ tactics because of its indifference, whether voluntary or
170
not, to the cultural differences it has with China, where “notions of
[IPR] have reflected cultural values, which are inseparable from cultural
171
and traditional values.”
While Americans today treat trademark
infringement as illegal and punishable as a crime, the Chinese tend to
treat intellectual sharing as a virtue and normal learning process. This
certainly demonstrates that the significance of historical events, social
norms, and cultural differences can be the major reason for the
widespread resistance among the Chinese against trademark
enforcement. As Scholar J. A. Lehman stated, the heart of the U.S.China IPR dispute “is a basic incompatibility between modern western
views of intellectual property and traditional Chinese ethical and social
172
thought.”
Thus, by disregarding China’s historical and cultural attributes, U.S.
policymakers have fundamentally misunderstood the capabilities of the
current power structure and enforcement mechanisms. “While concepts
167.
See SCOTT FAIRLEY, EXTRATERRITORIAL ASSERTIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
RIGHTS
IN
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE SEARCH FOR
A BALANCED SYSTEM 141, 144 (George R. Stewart et al. eds. 1994) (“unilateralism
begats unilateralism”).
168. See Craig R. Whitney, China Awards Huge Jet Order to Europeans, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 1996, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/11/world/china-awardshuge-jet-order-to-europeans.html?pagewanted=1.
169.
See Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC
Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 334-35 (2006).
170. Alford, supra note 147, at 19-22.
171. Seung-Hwan Mun, A New Approach to U.S. Copyright Policy against Piracy in
China,
at
3,
available
at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/1/1/8/5/pages111851/p11185
1-2.php (last visited March 5, 2011).
172. John Allen Lehman, Intellectual Property Rights and Chinese Tradition Section:
Philosophical Foundation, J. BUS. ETHICS 1 (2006).
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of intellectual property law might be fully understandable to westerners,
173
many Chinese people view and understand them differently.”
Meanwhile, China’s efforts to improve and enforce its intellectual
property regime, while trying simultaneously to stem trademark
infringement and other counterfeiting activities, must not be
174
overlooked. Thus, U.S. businesses that have the desire to expand their
operations in China, while in need to protect their trademarks, will first
be required to appreciate the Chinese culture.
Furthermore, the United States, which has valued the rights of
intellectual property owners and their individual freedom for more than
two-hundred years, should acknowledge two things: first, China only
recognized IPR during the last twenty-years; second, China passed its
intellectual property laws before it developed a sense of intellectual
property rights among its nationals.
Finally, because U.S. policymakers have incorrectly assumed that
175
Western concepts of property rights have been universally accepted,
they wrongly believed that the mere exercise of external pressure would
improve trademark protection in China. Not surprisingly, the Chinese
government proved them wrong. The United States’ tactics did not
yield substantial improvement in trademark protection and enforcement
176
in China. Instead, it yielded hostility and discontentment.
The United States should recognize that the Chinese government
has made a concerted effort to raise public awareness among its
nationals of the importance of protecting both domestic and foreign
177
trademark by addressing China’s cultural perceptions.
A prime
example of Chinese national achievement is the 2008 Olympics Games,
which have strengthened the Chinese’s public awareness for the societal
benefits of stronger trademark protection. Indeed, China used the
Olympics to educate the public about trademark rights. Through the
2008 Olympics Games, China has proven that it can bridge the cultural
disconnect and demonstrated to its domestic business community that
178
global economic success is tied to effective trademark enforcement.
With the opening of the 2010 World Exposition in Shanghai on April 30,

173. Birden, supra note 88, at 494.
174. Id.
175. William P. Alford, How Theory Does—And Does Not—Matter: American
Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN. L.J. 8, 17
(1994).
176. Id.
177. Tian, supra note 23.
178. See Levine, supra note 49.
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2010, China will continue to educate its nationals with respect to
trademarks and prove to the outside world that it has the ability to
protect trademarks within its borders. In addition, China has started to
179
construct better infra-structures, institutions, and capacities. Foreign
educated Chinese are returning home, bringing with them western
business knowledge, technical know-how, cultural experience, and
180
personal contacts.
Furthermore, educating the public about
intellectual property and providing adequate training to lawyers and
judges on the principles of law governing the protection of trademarks
will take some time. China is gradually making changes to shift the
Party’s ideology to value trademark and IPR in general while
responding to international pressure from the United States. China can
certainly implement harsher penalties and establish effective relations
between the administrative and judicial bodies that are currently in
place to apply and enforce trademark laws on both the national and
local levels. Again, China’s current progress should not be overlooked.
China’s achievements over two decades in protecting trademark and
181
IPR in general have taken hundreds of years in some other nations.
“Educating people takes time and patience, especially a people as
182
diverse and well-entrenched in their beliefs as the Chinese.”
Thus, in order to protect a trademark owner’s trademark rights in
183
China, U.S. officials should remember these cultural differences and
account for Confucian ideology and Chinese societal norms when
negotiating with Chinese officials with respect to trademark
enforcement. To promote “real” progress in trademark protection, the
U.S. will have to change an entire nation’s societal and cultural
behaviors towards intellectual property. Thus, instead of exercising
further pressure on China, U.S. officials should engage in a “deeper
dialogue” with China and try understanding China’s traditional culture
and history.

179. Hu, supra note 5, at 119-20.
180. See ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE CENTURY- THE RISING CHINESE
ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE OF
POWER AND YOUR JOB 575 (Wharton School Publishing 2005). An estimated 160,000
Chinese students went abroad in 2002. The “turtles as they are called in China to denote the
tendency of the species to return to its birthplace could play a key role in China’s
technological transformation.
181. Kristie M. Kachuriak, Chinese Copyright Piracy: Analysis of the Problems and
Suggestions for Protection of U.S. Copyrights, 13 DICK. J. INT’L. L. 599, 605 (1995).
182. Birden, supra note 88, at 494.
183. Richard J. Ansson Jr., International Intellectual Property Rights, the United States,
and the People’s Republic of China, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 1, 24 (1999).
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B. China- EU Relationship: A Model Approach
The United States’ tactics to provide trademark protection to its
nationals in China provides a good illustration of “what has been tried
184
and failed.”
Conversely, China and the European Union have maintained a
harmonious relationship and thus should serve as a model in
strengthening the relationship between China and the U.S. European
companies have not been immune from infringement due to the lack of
proper trademark protection in China. As a fact, many of these
companies lobbied European institutions to initiate trade sanctions
185
against China.
However, unlike the China-U.S. relationship, China
and the European Union have maintained a more friendly relationship
186
on both political and economic levels. The dominant trend has been
to favor and strengthen bilateral cooperation with respect to IPR
187
protection.
Over the past years, the EU and China have built a remarkable
188
collaboration to protect IPR in China by engaging in a series of
negotiations to promote the development and enforcement of
trademark laws in China and intellectual property in general. For
instance, both nations held their first EU-China Annual Summit
189
(“Annual Summit”) in London in 1998. The purpose of the Annual
Summit has been to maintain current progress made by both nations
190
regarding IPR protection.
Specifically, in the course of the Eighth
191
Annual Summit in Beijing, in September 2005, Chinese and European
leaders emphasized the need to implement and enforce intellectual

184. Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 447.
185. Id. at 448.
186. Id. at 452.
187. The EU Ambassador to China, Mr. Serge Abou, commented on March 7, 2007 in
a press conference held in Shanghai, “the trade conflict between the EU and China is
inappreciable, as a small tree in a dense forest, and a strengthened cooperation is the
mainstream.”
188. WEI SHI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING
SYSTEM: EU-CHINA PERSPECTIVE 235 (2008).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 235-36.
191. Joint Statement of the 8th EU-China Summit, at art 4 (Sept. 5, 2005), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1091&format=HTML&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; see The Commission of the European Communities,
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 24
October 2006, EU-China: closer partners, growing responsibilities, available at
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/asia
/r14208_en.htm.
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property laws while protecting the interests of consumers and creating a
positive business environment for continued growth and protection.
Most recently, at the Twelfth Annual Summit in Nanjing, in November
2009, leaders of both sides applauded the achievements in the
development of bilateral relations and agreed that a political mutual
trust is enhancing their continued support for each other’s peaceful and
192
sustainable development. Both sides further agreed to stay committed
to the strategic nature of the EU-China relationship and pledged to seek
greater development based on mutual respect, equality, mutual benefit,
193
openness, and win-win cooperation. Additionally, the EU and China
launched the EU-China Intellectual Property Rights Cooperation
194
Programme (“the EU-China Programme”) in 1998. The main goal of
the EU-China Programme was to promote bilateral trade by fostering
China’s commitment to develop an effective system for the protection of
195
trademarks and intellectual property in general.
The EU-China
Programme, which was managed by the European Patent Office,
included the training judges and attorneys of administrative
enforcement, public awareness, border enforcement, as well as
196
conducting seminars and workshops in Beijing and in the provinces.
Another mechanism in place to ensure IPR protection and enforcement
in China is the EU-China Intellectual Property Dialogue (“IDP”). The
IDP, launched in 2003, provides a structured annual dialogue between
the European Commission and China. During the 2007 IDP, the EU
and China discussed the issue of “cleaning out retail and wholesale
markets” that sell counterfeits and pirated goods, and China expressed
197
“satisfaction.”
One of the factors that helps understand the relationship between
the European Union and China is the ongoing support, rather than
constant criticism, that the EU has expressed toward the Chinese
government.
For instance, Chinese cultural features have been
accepted and understood by the EU for more than two thousand
192. Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit (Nov. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/111567.pdf
193. Id.
194. Shi, supra note 189, at 237.
195. See EU-China Project on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in China
(IPR2), http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/interntional-relations/project/eu-china.html (last
visited March 24, 2011).
196. Id.
197. See Outcome of the Third Meeting of the EU-China IP Dialogue, Brussels 15-16
March 2007, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/may/tradoc_134658.pdf p
2 (2007).

HOOVER - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

6/20/2011 1:04 PM

2011] COERCION WILL NOT PROTECT TRADEMARK OWNERS 353
198

years.
Thus, China and Europe have been able to develop and
maintain a close rapport despite their different values. Both nations
have strived to understand each other by privileging communication and
collaboration. Even more telling, the EU has been willing to adopt a
long-term tactical approach regarding trademark protection in China
because it has accepted that counterfeiting and piracy are common
problems in developing countries such as China. By doing so, the EU
has acknowledged China’s culture, which in turn has resulted in a better
understanding between China and Europe. According to Peter
Mandelson, the EU Trade Commissioner, the EU “has accepted that
IPR is a complex issue and that China’s commercial culture and legal
199
system need time to absorb change.” Moreover, although substantial
work is still required, the EU and China have made several encouraging
institutional arrangements, including the establishment of the EUIntellectual Property Dialogue. In contrast, the United States has been
using Section 301 constantly in fighting counterfeiting and piracy,
without giving much credit to China’s economic adaptation and cultural
tradition. Furthermore, many of the U.S.-China bilateral agreements
pertaining to trademark and IPR protections in general were the result
of a coercive U.S. policy that aimed at imposing trade sanctions upon
China.
Moreover, while the United States overtly expressed its opposition
to China’s fast entry into the WTO, the EU has been most supportive of
China’s WTO membership. Indeed, despite the so-called “China
threat,” the EU has viewed China’s rapid economic growth as a unique
200
opportunity. Some authors argue that the EU’s position may be partly
understood because the absence of China’s growth would be considered
201
a greater threat to global affairs.
While this may be true, the EU’s
relationship with China is based on greater tolerance, which has proven
to be a better approach to address trademark enforcement in China
than the U.S.-China model.
The U.S.’s external pressure upon China definitely led to the
implementation of new trademark laws; however, it is the understanding
of China’s culture that will help influence Chinese attitudes towards IPR
in general. Thus, the U.S. should learn from the EU and adopt a more
198. Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 448.
199. Peter Mandelson, Protecting IPR in China, Speech at Trade Fairs SeminarBeijing
(Nov.
26,
2007),
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/751&type=HTML.
200. Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 450.
201. See id.
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lenient approach so that it can cultivate and maintain a long-term
relationship based on the understanding of China’s unique culture.
With regard to international IPR, the U.S. policy seems to have
somewhat influenced political considerations. For instance, the recent
WTO complaints against China under the Bush administration may be a
response to reduce the trade deficit with China, which amounts to 268
202
billion dollars.
Because of such deficit, the White House appealed
203
vigorously to intensifying anti-China “sentiments” in Congress with
respect to bilateral trade deficits with China by lobbying several
economic sanctions. In comparison, although the EU suffered a trade
deficit with China, the Europeans, unlike the Americans, blamed the
deficit to the obstacle in market access in China and believe that such
204
deficit would be reduced if China were to further open its markets.
The cultivation of valuable business relationships with the Chinese is
205
often a long-term process that requires a great deal of patience.
Despite the current threat of trademark infringement in China, this is
the approach that the European Union has decided to adopt. This is
also the approach the United States should adopt to promote trademark
protection in China. The EU has correctly acknowledged that an
understanding of Chinese culture facilitates relationship-building and
can help trademark protection in China. Thus, the United States should
adopt the China-EU model in its fight against trademark violations in
China.
CONCLUSION
This article offers no easy answer to trademark enforcement in
China. However, it points out the need to address trademark protection
in China within the Chinese cultural and socio-economic setting. In the
past several years, China’s ability to protect trademark and IPR in
general has dramatically risen under the pressure of the United States.
China is taking intellectual property concerns very seriously and is
aware that more needs to be achieved. As the United States has
learned, attempts to make rapid and fundamental changes, such as those
aimed at enforcing trademark laws in China, are destined to fail. Thus,
202.
See US-China Business Council, US-China Trade Facts, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china (last visited March 10, 2010).
203. Jonathan Weisman, China’s Demands Anger Congress, May Hurt Bid, WASH.
POST, July 6, 2005, at DO1, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-58566.html (last
visited April 19, 2010).
204. Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 452.
205. See Tze-Hun Chou, supra note 130, at 396.
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emphasis should be made on long-term goals.
To solve the trademark and IPR enforcement issues in the long run,
China will continue to educate its people and help them adjust views
and attitudes towards IPR. As of today, the change in Chinese culture
206
is at a slow pace.
It is only when Chinese people understand the
impact and need of IPR protection and become stakeholders of IPR
that they will be willing to change their attitudes and support IPR
protection. Meanwhile, the United States should be more sensitive to
Chinese cultural and social conventions and seek creative solutions to
enforce trademark in China, rather than forcing solutions on the
207
Chinese that do not fit China’s cultural context.
While China will
undoubtedly encounter problems along the way, as it already has, its
efforts to combat trademark violations should be credited. Because
China will continue to attract foreign business, it can be expected that
China will live up to the terms of its commitment and will do whatever it
can to enforce its existing trademark laws.

206.
207.

Allison & Lin, supra note 24, at 790.
Id.

